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A review of empirical evidence on
different uncanny valley hypotheses:
support for perceptual mismatch as
one road to the valley of eeriness
Jari Kätsyri *, Klaus Förger, Meeri Mäkäräinen and Tapio Takala
Department of Computer Science, School of Science, Aalto University, Espoo, Finland
The uncanny valley hypothesis, proposed already in the 1970s, suggests that almost
but not fully humanlike artificial characters will trigger a profound sense of unease. This
hypothesis has become widely acknowledged both in the popular media and scientific
research. Surprisingly, empirical evidence for the hypothesis has remained inconsistent.
In the present article, we reinterpret the original uncanny valley hypothesis and review
empirical evidence for different theoretically motivated uncanny valley hypotheses. The
uncanny valley could be understood as the naïve claim that any kind of human-likeness
manipulation will lead to experienced negative affinity at close-to-realistic levels. More
recent hypotheses have suggested that the uncanny valley would be caused by
artificial–human categorization difficulty or by a perceptual mismatch between artificial
and human features. Original formulation also suggested that movement would modulate
the uncanny valley. The reviewed empirical literature failed to provide consistent support
for the naïve uncanny valley hypothesis or the modulatory effects of movement.
Results on the categorization difficulty hypothesis were still too scarce to allow drawing
firm conclusions. In contrast, good support was found for the perceptual mismatch
hypothesis. Taken together, the present review findings suggest that the uncanny valley
exists only under specific conditions. More research is still needed to pinpoint the exact
conditions under which the uncanny valley phenomenon manifests itself.
Keywords: uncanny valley, human-likeness, anthropomorphism, perceptual mismatch, categorical perception,
computer animation
Introduction
Masahito Mori predicted already in the 1970s that although people would in general have favor-
able reactions toward increasingly humanlike robots, almost but not fully human robots would
be unsettling (Mori, 1970). Mori used a hypothetical curve to characterize this relationship, and
coined the sudden dip in this curve at almost humanlike levels as the uncanny valley (Figure 1).
AlthoughMori focused on robots and other mechanical devices, the hypothesis was general enough
to incorporate other domains as well. Some relevant technological innovations, such as prosthetic
limbs and prototypes of anthropomorphic robots, already existed at the time when the uncanny
valley hypothesis was published (cf. Mori, 1970). However, the uncanny valley hypothesis has
become fully topical only during the last two decades or so, during which computer animation
technologies have seen rapid advances. Although highly realistic computer-animated faces can
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FIGURE 1 | Mori’s uncanny valley curve demonstrating the non-linear
relationship between the human-likeness of stimuli (clearly artificial to
fully human-like) and the observers’ sense of affinity for them (negative
to positive). Human-likeness levels (L1to L4) that correspond roughly with the
turning points of the curves have been highlighted on the horizontal axis, and
the uncanny valley proper has been emphasized with a dark gray color.
Adapted with permission from MacDorman (2005).
already be produced (e.g., Alexander et al., 2010; Perry, 2014),
contemporary computer animation techniques still tend to suf-
fer from subtle imperfections related for example to rendering,
lighting, surface materials, and movement dynamics. Hence, it
is not surprising that the uncanny valley hypothesis has been
adopted to explain the poor commercial success of some ani-
mated films in the media (cf. citations in Brenton et al., 2005;
Geller, 2008; Eberle, 2009; Misselhorn, 2009; Pollick, 2010). The
uncanny valley hypothesis has also motivated research in various
fields beyond robotics and computer animation including, but
not limited to, developmental psychology (Matsuda et al., 2012),
neuroimaging (e.g., Cheetham et al., 2011; Saygin et al., 2012),
animal studies (Steckenfinger and Ghazanfar, 2009), Bayesian
statistics (Moore, 2012), and philosophy (Misselhorn, 2009).
Against this background, it is surprising that empirical evi-
dence for the uncanny valley hypothesis is still ambiguous if not
non-existent. Early research reviews from year 2005 noted the
lack of empirical studies on the uncanny valley (Brenton et al.,
2005; Gee et al., 2005; Hanson, 2005). To our knowledge, empir-
ical evidence for the existence of the uncanny valley has still
not been reviewed systematically. Several reviews have elaborated
the original hypothesis and its underlying mechanisms (Ishig-
uro, 2006, 2007; Tondu and Bardou, 2011) or applied the original
hypothesis in specific contexts (Eberle, 2009), but these reviews
have not taken clear sides on the existence of the uncanny valley.
Two recent reviews have concluded that the empirical evidence
for the uncanny valley is either absent or inconsistent (Pollick,
2010; Zlotowski et al., 2013). These reviews have, however, cited
direct evidence from relatively few studies that pertained directly
to their specific fields (psychology and human-robot interac-
tion, respectively). A possible reason for the lack of empirical
research reviews could be that although a plethora of uncanny
valley articles have been published, it is difficult to identify which
of them have tested the original hypothesis directly and which
have been merely derived from it.
It is also possible that there exist not one but many plausible
uncanny valley hypotheses. Because the original uncanny valley
hypothesis was intended as a broadly applicable guideline rather
than an explicit experimental hypothesis (cf. Pollick, 2010), it
is likely to be consistent with several more specific hypothe-
ses. Some of these hypotheses could be derived from established
psychological constructs and theories. In some cases, minor
adjustments to the original uncanny valley hypothesis could be
justified. Because the two major dimensions of the uncanny
valley—the human-likeness of stimuli and the observers’ experi-
ence of affinity for them—were not defined clearly in the original
uncanny valley formulation, these dimensions could be oper-
ationalized in various different ways. Consequently, different
uncanny valley studies could end up addressing different the-
oretical constructs and hypotheses depending on their specific
methodological decisions. Because the human-likeness is diffi-
cult to operationalize, confounding factors and other alternative
explanations could also limit the conclusions that can be drawn
from individual studies.
The main goal of the present article was to review up-to-
date empirical research evidence for a framework of plausible
uncanny valley hypotheses derived from the original uncanny
valley article (Mori, 1970) and other more recent publications.
The review consists of five major sections. First, we will provide
an interpretation of the original human-likeness and affinity
dimensions of the uncanny valley (Section An Interpretation of
the Uncanny Valley). We will argue that a literal interpretation
of Mori’s original examples, especially those involving morbid
characters (i.e., corpses and zombies), would confound human-
likeness with extraneous factors. We will also suggest that the
original formulation of the affinity dimension could be inter-
preted both in terms of perceptual familiarity and emotional
valence. Second, we will formulate a framework of empirically
testable uncanny valley hypotheses based on the preceding anal-
ysis (Section A Framework of Uncanny Valley Hypotheses). In
addition, we will reiterate the recent categorization ambiguity
and perceptual mismatch hypotheses (e.g., Brenton et al., 2005;
Pollick, 2010; Cheetham et al., 2011). Third, we will formu-
late explicit criteria for article inclusion and evaluation (Sec-
tion Article Selection and Evaluation). Fourth, we will review
empirical evidence for the formulated hypotheses based on the
adopted evaluation criteria (Section Review of Empirical Evi-
dence). Finally, we will discuss the implications and limitations
of our findings and consider open questions in uncanny valley
research (Section Discussion).
An Interpretation of the Uncanny Valley
What Is Human-Likeness?
Human-likeness is not a single quality of artificial characters
that could be traced back to specific static, dynamic, or behav-
ioral features—instead, human-likeness could be varied in an
almost infinite number of different ways. Mori (1970) him-
self used anecdotal examples to characterize different degrees
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of human-likeness. We have highlighted some of these exam-
ples in Figure 1 and summarized them in Table 1. The hypo-
thetical human-likeness levels corresponding with the selected
examples have been labeled from L1 to L4. Mori used indus-
trial robots (L1) as an example of the least humanlike characters
with any resemblance to real humans. Although clearly artifi-
cial, such characters have some remotely humanlike characteris-
tics, such as arms for gripping objects. Stuffed animals and toy
robots (L2) were placed close to the first peak of the uncanny
curve. Like industrial robots, these characters are clearly artifi-
cial; however, unlike industrial robots, such characters have also
been purposefully designed to resemble humans. Mori placed
two different kinds of objects or characters near the bottom of
the valley. First, Mori mentioned prosthetic hands (L3) as an
example of manmade artifacts that have been meant to appear
humanlike but that have failed to do so because of some arti-
ficial qualities. Second, Mori mentioned human corpses and
zombies (Lm) when considering danger avoidance as a spec-
ulative explanation of the uncanny valley. Finally, Mori used
healthy humans (L4) as an example of full human-likeness.
In these examples, Mori referred to both static and moving
instances of similar characters (e.g., still and animate corpses)
to illustrate how movement would amplify the uncanny curve
(Figure 1).
Table 1 also illustrates two extraneous factors that could
affect affinity responses to the above anecdotal examples if they
were taken literally. First, stuffed animals and toy robots could
elicit positive reactions not only because they appear somewhat
humanlike but because they have been purposefully designed
to appear aesthetic. Similarly, human corpses, whether still or
animate, would certainly not evoke negative reactions only
because they appear humanlike but because they are morbid
and horrifying. These considerations strongly suggest that Mori’s
original examples should not be adopted literally in empirical
studies. However, once this approach is rejected, the question still
remains which human-likeness manipulations should be used in
empirical studies out of all imaginable possibilities. Although this
question does not yet have an agreed upon answer, there seems to
be a trend toward using image morphing and computer graphics
(CG) techniques for manipulating facial stimuli in recent studies
(cf. Table S1).
TABLE 1 | Focal points on the human-likeness dimension of the uncanny
valley graph.
HL Anecdotal Human-likeness Extraneous Affinity
examples factors
L1 Industrial robot Clearly artificial – Neutral
L2 Stuffed animal,
toy robot
Somewhat humanlike Aesthetics Positive
L3 Prosthetic hand Almost humanlike – Negative
Lm Corpse, zombie Almost humanlike Morbidity Negative
L4 Healthy human Fully humanlike – Very positive
Anecdotal examples refer to Mori (1970).
HL—degree of human-likeness.
What Is Affinity?
Mori’s original Japanese terms bukimi and shinwakan (or shin-
wakan) for the affinity dimension referred to several different
concepts. The negative term bukimi translates quite unequivo-
cally into eeriness (Ho and MacDorman, 2010), although other
similar terms such as creepiness and strangeness have also been
used (cf. Ho et al., 2008). In contrast, the positive term shin-
wakan is an unconventional Japanese word, which does not have
a direct equivalent in English (Bartneck et al., 2007, 2009). The
earliest and the most common translation of this term has been
familiarity; however, it has been argued that likability would
be a more appropriate translation (ibid.). In the latest English
translation of Mori’s original article, shinwakan was translated
as affinity (Mori, 1970/2012). Similarly, we have adopted affin-
ity when referring to the bukimi–shinwakan dimension in the
present article. Table 2 lists dictionary definitions (Merriam-
Webster Online Dictionary; http://www.merriam-webster.com;
accessed 24.11.2014) for the most commonly used affinity terms.
A closer inspection of these terms would suggest that all of
them refer to various aspects of perceptual familiarity and emo-
tional valence. Perceptual familiarity refers to recognizing that
the perceived character has similar qualities as another object the
observer is already well acquainted with (possibly, the observer
himself or herself). Emotional valence covers various positive
(liking, pleasantness, and attraction) and negative (aversive sen-
sations) emotions elicited by the character. Although positive
and negative affinity could be considered separately (e.g., Ho and
MacDorman, 2010), emotional valence is an established psycho-
logical concept (e.g., Russell, 2003) that is able to incorporate
both of them.
Given that the original terms for the affinity dimension (or
at least their common translations) are ambiguous, empirical
studies would be necessary for resolving which self-report items
would be ideal for measuring affinity. Previous studies have sug-
gested that eeriness is associated with other negative emotion
terms such as fear, disgust, and nervousness (Ho et al., 2008); or
fear, unattractiveness, and disgust (Burleigh et al., 2013). To our
TABLE 2 | Dictionary definitions for the common English translations of
Mori’s affinity dimension.
English term Definitions
Eeriness [The quality of being] strange and mysterious
[...] so mysterious, strange, or unexpected as to send a chill up
the spine
Likability [...] easy to like
[...] pleasant or appealing
[…bringing] about a favorable regard
Familiarity The state of being [well acquainted] with something
[...] having knowledge about something
A state of close relationship [similar to intimacy]
Affinity A feeling of closeness and understanding that someone has for
another person because of their similar qualities, ideas, or
interests
A liking for or an attraction to something
The state of being similar or the same
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knowledge, only one previous study up to date has used factor
analytic methods to develop a conclusive self-report question-
naire for uncanny valley studies (Ho and MacDorman, 2010).
This study identified orthogonal factors for human-likeness, eeri-
ness (two separate factors: eerie and spine-tingling), and attrac-
tiveness. An informal evaluation would suggest some potential
problems with this questionnaire, however. First, some of the
questionnaire items are not necessarily ideal for measuring their
intended constructs in all contexts. For example, the semantic
differential items “ordinary—supernatural” and “without definite
lifespan—mortal” could be inappropriate human-likeness mea-
sures when none of the evaluated stimuli are supernatural. Sec-
ond, although the identified eeriness factors are consistent with
Mori’s original terms, their constituent items (e.g., “numbing—
freaky” and “unemotional—hair-rising”) do not resemble items
in typical emotion self-report questionnaires (cf. self-report items
in Bradley and Lang, 1994). Third, familiarity items were not
considered in the study, although familiarity would seem to be
an integral part of the uncanny valley. Although future empiri-
cal studies might be useful for refining this scale, this work is an
important step toward developing a commonmetric for the affin-
ity dimension. The scale has already been applied in at least two
studies (Mitchell et al., 2011; MacDorman et al., 2013).
A Framework of Uncanny Valley
Hypotheses
Figure 2 illustrates the preceding analysis of the uncanny valley
phenomenon (Section An Interpretation of the Uncanny Val-
ley) and the relations between the present hypotheses and the
uncanny valley concepts.
Naïve Hypotheses
The question of which specific human-likeness manipulations
should be used in empirical uncanny valley studies could be
sidestepped by assuming that any kind of manipulation would
lead to the characteristic uncanny curve for affinity (Figure 1).
However, this hypothesis is simplistic because it assumes that all
imaginable human-likeness manipulations are equally relevant
for the uncanny valley. Consequently, it could be referred to as
a naïve uncanny valley hypothesis as opposed to more specific
hypotheses (Section Refined Hypotheses). We have attempted to
formulate this hypothesis so that it would be compatible with
various human-likeness manipulations ranging from categori-
cal manipulations with a minimal number of human-likeness
levels to fully continuous manipulations. Figure 3 illustrates
the original uncanny curve for the four most focal human-
likeness levels (Table 1). These levels constitute the minimal set
of human-likeness levels that could be used to capture the most
relevant aspects of the original uncanny curve.
The core claim of the uncanny valley is that almost human-
like characters will elicit more negative affinity than any other
characters (Figure 3). As can be seen in the darkened region of
Figure 1, this characteristic U-shaped curve forms the uncanny
valley proper. Because almost humanlike characters would need
to be compared to both more artificial and more humanlike char-
acters, the bare minimum for testing this prediction would be
three human-likeness levels (cf. Figure 3). Although not equally
critical, the original uncanny valley hypothesis also predicts that,
except for the uncanny valley proper, affinity will bemore positive
for increasingly humanlike characters. That is, affinity increases
when moving from clearly artificial to somewhat humanlike
characters, and there would also be a relative increase between
somewhat and fully humanlike characters (Figure 3). Given that
this hypothesis omits almost humanlike characters, at least the
remaining three levels in Figure 3 would need to be used to
test this prediction. These predictions can be formulated as the
following hypotheses.
H1a (“naïve uncanny valley proper”): For any kind of human-
likeness manipulation, almost humanlike characters will elicit
more negative affinity (lower familiarity and/or more negative
emotional valence) than any other more artificial or more human-
like characters.
H1b (“naïve human-likeness”): For any kind of human-likeness
manipulation, more humanlike characters will elicit more posi-
tive affinity (higher familiarity and/or more positive emotional
valence), with the possible exception of characters fulfilling H1a.
Morbidity Hypothesis
Although purposefully morbid characters could be adopted from
the original uncanny valley formulation (Mori, 1970) and used
in empirical uncanny valley studies, such characters would con-
found the more interesting effects of varying human-likeness
(Section What is Human-Likeness?). Although it is quite triv-
ial that such characters should evoke negative affinity, we have
nevertheless formulated the following hypothesis to help separate
morbidity effects from those of other hypotheses.
H1c (“morbidity”): Morbid characters (e.g., corpses or zombies) will
elicit more negative affinity (lower familiarity and/or more negative
emotional valence) than any other characters.
Movement Hypotheses
In his original formulation, Mori (1970) also suggested that
movement would amplify the uncanny curve. That is, the posi-
tive and negative affinity experiences elicited by the still charac-
ters should becomemore pronounced formoving characters. The
role of movement could, however, be more complex than origi-
nally predicted. For example, although Mori considered move-
ment as a dichotomous variable—it either is or is not present—
movement features could also range in human-likeness and lead
to an uncanny curve of their own. This leads to the following
reformulations of the naïve uncanny hypotheses (H1a and H1b).
H2a (“uncanny valley proper for movement”): For any kind of
human-likeness manipulation, “almost humanlike” movement
patterns will elicit more negative affinity (lower familiarity and/or
more negative emotional valence) than any other more artificial or
more humanlike movement patterns.
H2b (“human-likeness for movement”): For any kind of human-
likeness manipulation, more humanlike movement patterns will
elicit more positive affinity (higher familiarity and/or more positive
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FIGURE 2 | A concept map demonstrating relations between the
present uncanny valley hypotheses and different uncanny valley
concepts derived from Mori (1970). Dashed lines refer to constructs that
have been explicated after Mori’s original publication. Hypotheses:
H1a—naïve UV proper, H1b—naïve HL, H1c—morbidity, H2a—UV proper for
movement, H2b—HL for movement, H2c—movement modulation,
H3a—category identification, H3b—perceptual discrimination,
H3c—categorical identification difficulty, H3d—opposite perceptual
discrimination, H3e—perceptual discrimination difficulty, H4a—inconsistent
HL, H4b—atypicality; UV—uncanny valley, HL—human-likeness.
FIGURE 3 | Predicted affinity levels (from negative to positive) for still
and moving versions of characters representing different
human-likeness levels. The characteristic uncanny curve is overlain on the
data for illustration.
emotional valence), with the possible exception of movement pat-
terns fulfilling H2a
The original movement hypothesis can be stated as follows.
H2c (“movement modulation”): Movement will amplify the affin-
ity responses (changes in familiarity and/or emotional valence)
associated with hypotheses H1a and H1b.
Testing movement hypotheses H2a–c would require the same
number of minimum human-likeness levels as the more general
hypotheses H1a and H1b (that is, three levels; the specific levels
depending on the hypothesis).
Refined Hypotheses
Categorization Ambiguity
Early uncanny valley postulations have suggested that nega-
tive affinity would be caused by the ambiguity in categorizing
highly realistic artificial characters as real humans or artificial
entities (e.g., Ramey, 2005 [quoted in MacDorman and Ishig-
uro, 2006]; Pollick, 2010). Notably, this suggestion itself does
not yet consider whether the human-likeness dimension of the
uncanny valley is perceived continuously or categorically—that
is, some intermediate characters could be difficult to categorize
regardless of whether increasing human-likeness were perceived
as a gradual continuum or discretely as artificial and human
categories.
Categorical perception, which is an empirically and theoret-
ically established construct in psychology, has been applied to
the uncanny valley in recent empirical studies (Cheetham et al.,
2011, 2014). Loosely speaking, categorical perception refers to
the phenomenon where the categories possessed by an observer
influence his or her perceptions (Goldstone and Hendrickson,
2010). Specifically, categorical perception is thought to occur
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when the perceptual discrimination is enhanced for pairs of
perceptually adjacent stimuli straddling a hypothetical category
boundary between two categories, and decreased for equally
spaced pairs belonging to the same category (Repp, 1984; Har-
nad, 1987; Goldstone and Hendrickson, 2010). Applied to the
uncanny valley, categorical perception would mean that “[. . . ]
irrespective of physical differences in humanlike appearance,
objects along the DOH [degree of human-likeness] are treated
as conceptually equivalent members of either the category
‘non-human’ or the category ‘human,’ except at those levels of
physical realism at the boundary between these two categories.”
(Cheetham et al., 2011, p. 2).
The two most commonly agreed upon criteria for experi-
mental demonstrations of categorical perception are category
identification and perceptual discrimination (Repp, 1984; Har-
nad, 1987). The identification criterion means that stimulus
identification in a labeling task should follow a steep slope such
that labeling probabilities change abruptly at the hypothetical
category boundary. Given that the location of category boundary
cannot be known in advance, the minimum number of required
stimulus levels for testing this hypothesis cannot be determined
precisely. In practice, previous uncanny valley studies have
employed at least 11 evenly distributed human-likeness steps
along the human-likeness continuum (e.g., Looser andWheatley,
2010; Cheetham et al., 2011, 2014). Response times have been
used as an index of uncertainty in the identification task (e.g.,
Pisoni and Tash, 1974; de Gelder et al., 1997). Assuming that
categorization ambiguity should be the greatest at the category
boundary, the slowest response times should also coincide with
this point. That is,
H3a (“category identification”): A steep category boundary will exist
on the human-likeness axis such that characters on the left and right
sides of this boundary are labeled consistently as “artificial” and
“human,” respectively; and/or this identification task will elicit the
slowest response times at the category boundary.
The discrimination criterion refers to the above requirement that
perceptual discrimination should be better for stimulus pairs
straddling the category boundary than for equally spaced stim-
ulus pairs falling on the same side of the category boundary.
As an example from previous work (Cheetham et al., 2011), the
four stimulus pairs artificial–artificial, artificial–human, human–
artificial, and human–human could be derived from identifica-
tion results and employed in the perceptual discrimination task.
All possible stimulus pairs that are differentiated by an equal
number of steps on the human-likeness continuum could also be
used (e.g., Cheetham et al., 2014). As a summary, to demonstrate
categorical perception for the human-likeness dimension of the
uncanny valley, the following hypothesis should be confirmed in
addition H3a.
H3b (“perceptual discrimination”): Character pairs that straddle
the category boundary between “artificial” and “human” categories
will be easier to discriminate perceptually than equally different
character pairs located on the same side of the boundary.
After demonstrating that the human-likeness dimension is
perceived categorically, it would still need to be shown that
category identification difficulty (i.e., H3a) is also associated with
subjective experiences of negative affinity. The most straightfor-
ward assumption would be that identification uncertainty at the
category boundary (“categorization ambiguity”) leads to negative
affinity. Strictly speaking, this hypothesis is not fully consistent
with categorical perception as it is commonly understood, given
that the hypothesis refers only to the category identification crite-
rion (cf. H3a), whereas perceptual discrimination criterion (H3b)
has been considered as the hallmark of categorical perception
(e.g., Harnad, 1987). Hence, categorization ambiguity could lead
to negative affinity even in the absence of categorical percep-
tion (i.e., when only H3a but not H3b holds true). However, we
have included this hypothesis, as it is consistent with the early
uncanny valley literature (Ramey, 2005 [quoted in MacDorman
and Ishiguro, 2006]; Pollick, 2010). Hence, we have formulated
this hypothesis as follows.
H3c (“categorical identification difficulty”): Characters that are
located at the category boundary between “artificial” and “human”
categories (as identified in H3a-b) will elicit more negative affinity
(lower familiarity and/or more negative emotional valence) than
any other characters that are located on the left or right sides of the
category boundary.
As suggested recently by Cheetham et al. (2014), the original
uncanny valley hypothesis is based on the implicit assumption
that perceptual discrimination is the most difficult for characters
in the uncanny valley. However, assuming that the uncanny val-
ley proper is thought of as coinciding with the category boundary
and that this boundary is considered in terms of the categorical
perception framework, it follows (as in Cheetham et al., 2014)
that perceptual discrimination performance should actually be
easier for characters at or in the close vicinity of the category
boundary and not more difficult. As can be seen, this is the posi-
tion taken in hypothesis H3b, and the perceptual discrimination
difficulty assumption would be its opposite. Assuming that per-
ceptual discrimination would be more difficult for characters in
the uncanny valley, this difficulty should also be associated with
negative affinity. These hypotheses can be stated as follows.
H3d (“opposite perceptual discrimination”): Character pairs that
straddle the category boundary between “artificial” and “human”
categories will be more difficult to discriminate perceptually than
equally different character pairs located on the same side of the
boundary.
H3e (“perceptual discrimination difficulty”): Increased perceptual
discrimination difficulty for adjacent character pairs will be asso-
ciated with heightened negative affinity (lower familiarity and/or
more negative emotional valence).
Perceptual Mismatch
Hypotheses H3a-e are attractive because they are related to the
well-established framework of categorical perception. However,
there are several reasons for considering also other alterna-
tives to these categorization ambiguity and categorical perception
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based explanations. First, there is no a priori reason for expect-
ing that the human-likeness dimension should be perceived
categorically rather than continuously. For example, Campbell
et al. (1997) has demonstrated that whereas morphed continua
between human and cow faces are perceived categorically, similar
continua between humans and monkeys are continuous. Simi-
larly as humans and other primates, humans and anthropomor-
phic characters share many fundamental similarities that could
place them in the same overarching category of humanlike enti-
ties (cf. Campbell et al., 1997; Cheetham et al., 2011). Second,
negative affinity could of course be caused by some other mech-
anisms in addition to (or instead of) categorization ambiguity or
categorical perception. For example, it is conceivable that some
characters on the “human” side of the category boundary would
be considered eerie because they appeared human but contained
features that are not “entirely right.” In this hypothetical but con-
ceivable example, a negative affinity peak would be located on the
right side of the category boundary.
The perceptual mismatch hypothesis, which is theoretically
independent from the categorization ambiguity and categorical
perception hypotheses, has been presented recently as another
explanation for the uncanny valley (e.g., MacDorman et al., 2009;
Pollick, 2010). This hypothesis suggests that negative affinity
would be caused by an inconsistency between the human-likeness
levels of specific sensory cues. Clearly artificial eyes on an other-
wise fully human-like face—or vice versa—is an example of such
inconsistency. A particularly interesting proposal is that negative
affinity would be caused by inconsistent static and dynamic infor-
mation (Brenton et al., 2005; Pollick, 2010). The bare minimum
for testing this hypothesis would be four experimental manipula-
tion levels (i.e., two realism levels × two different features). We
have formulated this hypothesis in more general terms below.
H4a (“inconsistent human-likeness”): Characters with inconsistent
artificial and humanlike features will elicit more negative affinity
(lower familiarity and/or more negative emotional valence) than
characters with consistently artificial or characters with consistently
humanlike features.
Another form of perceptual mismatch could be higher sensitiv-
ity to deviations from typical human norms for more humanlike
characters (e.g., Brenton et al., 2005; MacDorman et al., 2009).
Deviations from human norms could result, for example, from
such atypical features as grossly enlarged eyes. In the uncanny
valley context, a plausible explanation for this phenomenon could
be that the human visual system has acquiredmore expertise with
the featural restrictions of other humans than with the featu-
ral restrictions of artificial characters (cf. Seyama and Nagayama,
2007). This hypothesis is also consistent with previous studies
demonstrating that faces with typical or average features are con-
sidered more attractive than atypical faces (e.g., Langlois and
Roggman, 1990; Rhodes et al., 2001). The atypicality hypothe-
sis is similar to the above inconsistency hypothesis, given that
atypical features could also be considered artificial. In fact, these
two hypotheses have previously been considered as the same
hypothesis (e.g., MacDorman et al., 2009). However, the atyp-
icality hypothesis could refer to any deviant features besides
artificiality (e.g., any distorted human features) and, unlike the
inconsistency hypothesis, it makes a unilateral prediction related
to only humanlike characters. Testing atypicality would require
at least four experimental manipulation levels (artificial without
atypical features, artificial with atypical features, human without
atypical features, human with atypical features), and it could be
formulated as follows.
H4b (“atypicality”): Humanlike characters with atypical features
will elicit more negative affinity (lower familiarity and/or more neg-
ative valence) than artificial characters with atypical features, or
either humanlike or artificial characters without atypical features.
Relation to the Original Uncanny Valley Hypothesis
The above hypotheses can be seen as refinements of the origi-
nal uncanny valley hypothesis such that each of them narrows
the human-likeness conditions under which the uncanny valley is
expected to occur. These hypotheses pertain only to the uncanny
valley proper (i.e., the “almost humanlike” level), and they can-
not account for the first peak in the uncanny curve (cf. H1b and
Figure 3). Otherwise, all of these hypotheses would appear to be
consistent with the original uncanny valley hypothesis. For exam-
ple, all of them seem to be consistent with the following quote:
“One might say that the prosthetic hand has achieved a degree of
resemblance to the human form [. . . ]. However, once we realize
that the hand that looked real at first sight is actually artificial,
we experience an eerie sensation.” (Mori, 1970, p. 99; see also
MacDorman et al., 2009, p. 698). Here, the prosthetic hand could
have appeared eerie because it caused an artificial–human cate-
gory conflict (H3), it was perceived as containing mismatching
artificial and human features (H4a), or because the hand resem-
bled a real hand without fulfilling all of the typical characteristics
of human hands (H4b).
Article Selection and Evaluation
Evaluation Criteria
Table 3 displays the criteria that were used for selecting indi-
vidual studies and for evaluating their results. These criteria are
based on the general validity typology of Shadish et al. (2002),
which describes four different types of validity and their asso-
ciated threats. Our goal was to identify justifiable and plausible
threats for conclusions that can be drawn from the reviewed
studies to hypotheses H1–H4. Hence, we have not attempted
to develop a comprehensive list of all possible threats to the
experimental validity of individual studies.
Statistical Conclusion Validity
Statistical conclusion validity refers to the validity of inferring
that the experimental manipulations and measured outcomes
covaried with each other. At the bare minimum, any kind of sta-
tistical test should be used to provide evidence against chance
results. The predicted U-shaped relationship between human-
likeness and affinity (Figure 1) could be tested, for example, by
using second-order correlation tests or analysis of variance fol-
lowed by post-hoc comparisons. Linear correlation test would,
however, not be sufficient for testing the predicted nonlinear
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TABLE 3 | Evaluation criteria for possible threats that limit the conclusions
that could be drawn from individual studies to the present hypotheses.
Threat Validity type
No or inadequate statistical testsa Statistical conclusion
Heterogeneous stimuli Statistical conclusion
No manipulation check for human-likenessa Internal
Image morphing artifacts Internal
Categorical perception not testedb Construct
Irrelevant affinity measuresa Construct
Familiarity evaluations misunderstood Construct
Outlier stimuli (e.g., morbid characters) Construct
Alternative explanations Construct
Narrow human-likeness range Construct
Narrow set of manipulated stimuli Construct
Narrow participant sample External
Validity types refer to Shadish et al. (2002).
aUsed as article inclusion criteria.
bApplies only to the hypotheses H3c and H3e.
relationship. Statistical conclusion validity could also be compro-
mised by uncontrolled variation in the stimuli. This issue could
be a particular concern for realistic stimuli (e.g., video game
characters), whose features cannot be fully controlled. Extrane-
ous variation could possibly be reduced by careful pretesting of
stimuli and the inclusion of a large number of stimuli for each
stimulus category.
Internal Validity
Internal validity refers to whether the observed outcomes were
caused solely by experimental manipulations or whether they
would have occurred even without them. Failure to check or
confirm that human-likeness manipulations elicited consistent
changes in perceived human-likeness would raise doubts over
whether human-likeness was actually varied as intended, and
would hence threaten internal validity.
Artifacts produced by human-likeness manipulations could
also be considered as threats to internal validity (strictly speak-
ing, these and any other confounds would be threats to construct
validity in the original typology; cf. Shadish et al., 2002, p. 95).
We will consider image morphing artifacts in detail because this
method has become popular in uncanny valley studies (cf. Table
S1). Image morphing procedure is used to construct a sequence
of gradual changes between two images (e.g., CG and human
faces), and it consists of three phases: geometric correspondence
is established between the images, a warping algorithm is applied
to match the shapes of the original objects, and color values are
interpolated between the original and warped images (e.g., Wol-
berg, 1998). Image morphing algorithms are prone to at least
two kinds of artifacts (e.g., Wu and Liu, 2013). First, ghosting
or double-exposure between images can occur if they contain
different features, geometric correspondence has not been estab-
lished adequately, or warping has not been applied. Second, color
interpolation typically causes some blurring because it combines
values from several pixels in the original images. Imagemorphing
artifacts are a threat to validity because they are likely to coin-
cide with intermediate levels of human-likeness (i.e., the most
processed images). Cheetham and Jäncke (2013) have published
a detailed guideline for applying morphing to facial images in
uncanny valley studies. We have adopted the following crite-
ria from their guideline: (i) several morphed continua should be
used, (ii) selected endpoint images should be similar to each other
(i.e., the faces should have similar geometries, have neutral facial
expressions, and represent individuals of similar ages), (iii) align-
ment disparities should be avoided, and (iv) any external features
should be masked (i.e., hair and ears, jewelry, and other external
features).
Construct Validity
Construct validity refers to the extent to which the experimen-
tal manipulations and measured outcomes reflect their intended
cause and effect constructs. For example, if the categoriza-
tion ambiguity hypothesis (H3c or H3e) were demonstrated for
specific stimuli without also demonstrating that these stimuli
indeed were perceived categorically (H3a–b), it could be uncer-
tain whether categorical perception was in fact involved. For
the present purposes, we have required that the outcome mea-
sures should tap into the perceptual familiarity and/or emo-
tional valence constructs (Section What is Affinity?). A specific
threat related to self-reported familiarity is that it could be con-
founded with previous experience (e.g., a video game charac-
ter could be familiar because of its popularity). The inclusion
of outlier stimuli that represent other constructs besides vary-
ing human-likeness, for example morbidity (Section What is
Human-Likeness?), would also threaten construct validity. In the
present context, the hypothesis H1c was intended to set such con-
structs apart from human-likeness. It is also possible that affinity
changes could in some cases be explained by other alternative
constructs or phenomena (e.g., poor lip synchronization). A nar-
row range of manipulated human-likeness (e.g., only CG charac-
ters) could threaten construct validity because the results would
not necessarily generalize to the full range of human-likeness.
Application of human-likeness manipulations to only a single
stimulus character could also threaten construct validity, if it
were plausible that the manipulation results would contain other
irrelevant features in addition to or instead of human-likeness.
External Validity
External validity refers to what extent the observed causal rela-
tionship between manipulated and observed variables can be
generalized to other participants, experimental manipulations,
and measured outcomes. Generalizability could be considered by
comparing results from different studies. In practice, this would
be difficult because of the heterogeneity of uncanny valley studies
(cf. Table S1). For the present purposes, we have considered exter-
nal validity only to exclude results from individual studies with
clearly unrepresentative participant samples (e.g., only children).
Article Selection
We identified empirical uncanny valley studies by searching for
the key term “uncanny valley” in the following search engines:
Scopus (search in article title, abstract, and keywords; including
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 8 April 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 390
Kätsyri et al. Uncanny review
secondary documents; N = 273), PubMed (search in all fields;
N = 23), Science Direct (search in all fields; N = 134), and Web
of Science (search in topic; N = 114). The obtained list of arti-
cles was augmented by other articles cited in them and by articles
identified from other sources (N = 6). This initial list (N = 550)
was screened by the first author. Duplicate entries and other than
full-length articles published in peer-reviewed journals or confer-
ence proceedings were removed semi-automatically, and a cur-
sory selection was done to exclude studies that had clearly not
tested or considered the present hypotheses.
The screened list (N = 125) was evaluated by all authors for
eligibility. The following inclusion criteria were used (cf.Table 3):
(i) the study had addressed, implicitly or explicitly, at least one
of the hypotheses H1–H4; (ii) the study had used at least the
minimum number of human-likeness levels for each hypothe-
sis (cf. Section A Framework of Uncanny Valley Hypotheses);
(iii) human-likeness of stimuli had been tested explicitly and
confirmed; (iv) unless irrelevant for the tested hypothesis (i.e.,
H3a, H3b, and H3d), the study had used any of the conventional
self-report items (likability, eeriness, familiarity, or affinity) or
their equivalents for measuring affinity responses; and (v) jus-
tified statistical test had been used for testing the relationship
between human-likeness and affinity. Two studies that had not
tested human-likeness explicitly (Seyama and Nagayama, 2007;
Mäkäräinen et al., 2014) were nevertheless included because their
human-likeness manipulations (image morphing from artificial
to human faces and increasingly more abstract image manipu-
lations, respectively) should have been expected to elicit trivial
changes in perceived human-likeness. The final list of selected
articles (N = 17) is given in Table S1.
Article and Hypothesis Evaluation
The validity of conclusions from individual studies to hypotheses
H1–H4 was evaluated using those evaluation criteria in Table 3
that had not already been adopted as inclusion criteria. All threats
that were considered possible are listed in Table S1; however, only
those threats that were considered both plausible and relevant for
a specific hypothesis were used for excluding individual results.
To allow critical evaluation and possible reanalysis of the present
findings, we have attempted to highlight potential controversies
related to the inclusion and evaluation of studies when reviewing
the evidence for each hypothesis.
Because the selected articles had used heterogeneous method-
ologies and most of them had not reported effect size statistics,
a quantitative meta-analysis would not have been appropriate.
Instead, we opted to present the numbers of findings provid-
ing significant and non-significant evidence for each hypothesis.
Because significant findings opposite to hypotheses were rare,
they were pooled with the non-significant findings. Significant
opposite findings have been mentioned separately in the text.
Although this kind of “box score” approach is inferior to quan-
titative meta-analytic methods (Green and Hall, 1984), it can
nevertheless be used to provide an overall quantification of result
patterns in the reviewed literature. Following a previous recom-
mendation (Green and Hall, 1984), we adopted a 30% threshold
for deciding how many positive findings would be considered
significant evidence in favor of a specific hypothesis. All of the
reported findings were clearly above this threshold.
Review of Empirical Evidence
Naïve and Morbidity Hypotheses
Empirical evidence for naïve, morbidity, and movement
hypotheses is presented in Table 4. Whereas the results clearly
confirmed that affinity increased linearly across increasing
human-likeness (H1b; 7 out of 9 studies), the predicted uncanny
valley proper (H1a) received almost no support (1 out of 8
studies). As an exception, one study showed that pictures of
intermediate prosthetic hands were more eerie than pictures
of either mechanical or human hands (Poliakoff et al., 2013).
Two other studies provided results that resembled the uncanny
curve (McDonnell et al., 2012; Piwek et al., 2014); however,
closer inspection suggested that these results could have been
explained by outlier stimuli—that is, in terms of the hypothesis
H1c. Another one of these studies (McDonnell et al., 2012) could
have provided evidence for H1a even after the outlier stimulus
(purposefully ill character) was excluded. However, we consid-
ered this evidence inconsistent because both unrealistic (“Toon-
Bare” rendering) and realistic (“HumanBasic” rendering) stimuli
were found to be less appealing, friendly, and trustworthy than
the remaining stimuli.
One of the studies in Table 4 (Yamada et al., 2013) was
excluded from the total count because of plausible morphing arti-
facts. This study found a U-shaped curve for self-reported pleas-
antness vs. morphed human-likeness, which could have been
TABLE 4 | Empirical evidence for hypotheses H1 (naïve hypotheses and
morbidity) and H2 (movement).
Author/year H1a H1b H1c H2a H2b H2c
Seyama and Nagayama,
2007
− −
MacDorman et al., 2009 − +
Looser and Wheatley, 2010 − +
Thompson et al., 2011 − +
McDonnell et al., 2012 (+) + + (+)
Yamada et al., 2013 (+) (−)
Burleigh et al., 2013 − +
Carter et al., 2013 − +
Poliakoff et al., 2013 + (+)
Cheetham et al., 2014 − +
Piwek et al., 2014 (+) − + − + (−)
Rosenthal–von der Pütten
and Krämer, 2014
− +
Total 8 9 2 2 2 0
+ 1 7 2 0 2 0
− 7 2 0 2 0 0
Conclusions: “+”: significant in favor of the hypothesis, and “−”: non-significant or sig-
nificant against the hypothesis. Conclusions in parentheses have been omitted from total
scores because of plausible threats to validity. Hypotheses: H1a—naïve UV proper, H1b—
naïve HL, H1c—morbidity, H2a—UV proper for movement, H2b—HL for movement,
H2c—movement modulation. UV—uncanny valley, HL—human-likeness.
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taken as support for H1a. However, in this study, only one pair
of images had been selected for creating the human-likeness
continuum, the selected cartoon and human face were very dis-
similar from each other, and no masking had been used (cf. Sec-
tion Article Selection; and Cheetham and Jäncke, 2013). Hence,
it is possible that the lower pleasantness ratings for intermediate
morphs could have resulted from morphing artifacts rather than
intermediate human-likeness level. Consistently with this inter-
pretation, other morphing studies (Looser and Wheatley, 2010;
Cheetham et al., 2014) with masked faces and multiple matched
face pairs have failed to find a similar U-shaped curve for partic-
ipants’ evaluations. Another morphing study in Table 4 (Seyama
and Nagayama, 2007) had also used unmasked and quite dissim-
ilar face pairs; however, it is unlikely that the lack of significant
findings in this study could have been explained by morphing
artifacts.
Several other potentially interesting studies were excluded
during the initial selection and were hence not included in
Table 4 or Table S1. For example, seminal uncanny valley studies
(Hanson, 2006; MacDorman, 2006; MacDorman and Ishiguro,
2006) were excluded because these studies did not report sta-
tistical test results for their findings. Because these studies also
seemed to be influenced by morphing artifacts or the use of het-
erogeneous stimuli, their results for hypotheses H1a–b would
nevertheless have been excluded as per our evaluation criteria.
Results from several studies using realistic video game (or sim-
ilar) characters have also been excluded either because they had
not used statistical tests or because they had tested only linear
correlations statistically. Most of the excluded studies had also
deliberately included outlier characters (e.g., zombies) in their
experimental stimuli (e.g., Schneider et al., 2007; Tinwell et al.,
2010) and some of their results could have been explained by
alternative explanations (e.g., audiovisual asynchrony; Tinwell
et al., 2010, in press). We were able to identify only one published
study without such outlier characters (Flach et al., 2012) that
could be taken as tentative evidence for H1a. This study demon-
strated an uncanny curve for experienced discomfort (measured
as a dichotomous variable) across video game and film charac-
ters that represented different human-likeness levels. We con-
sidered this evidence tentative because no statistical tests had
been used; furthermore, the human-likeness range was somewhat
constrained by the use of only CG characters.
Movement Hypotheses
Wewere able to identify only two studies (Thompson et al., 2011;
Piwek et al., 2014) that could be taken as evidence for the inde-
pendent movement hypotheses H2a and H2b (Table 4). Results
from these two studies were, however, consistent with those of
the more general hypotheses H1a–b. That is, more humanlike
movement was found to elicit higher affinity (H2b) in both stud-
ies, whereas a nonlinear uncanny valley curve (H2a) was not
observed in either one of them. No studies addressing the mod-
ulatory effect of movement (H2c) survived the initial selection
and further evaluation. Two studies demonstrated modulatory
movement effects; however, these effects were specific to plausi-
ble outlier characters (ill-looking face in McDonnell et al., 2012;
and zombie character in Piwek et al., 2014). Furthermore, these
studies provided conflicting evidence: the former reported a sig-
nificant increase and the latter a significant decrease in negative
affinity for the moving characters.
Categorization Ambiguity Hypotheses
Empirical evidence for categorization ambiguity (H3) and per-
ceptual mismatch (H4) hypotheses is presented in Table 5. Four
studies demonstrated that a category boundary existed for the
identification of morphed facial image continua (H3a) and three
of these studies additionally demonstrated that discrimination
performance reached its peak when the images straddled this
category boundary (H3b). The opposite prediction that discrim-
ination performance would be the poorest in the vicinity of cat-
egory boundary (H3d) was not supported by any study. These
results hence provided reasonable evidence for the categorical
perception of morphed human-likeness continua. In contrast,
we managed to identify only two studies that tested affinity
responses elicited by categorization ambiguity (H3c); neither of
which could be taken as evidence in favor of this hypothesis.
Opposite to hypothesis H3e, one study (Cheetham et al., 2014)
demonstrated that increased perceptual discrimination difficulty
is associated with positive rather than negative affinity.
Two other studies demonstrating favorable evidence for H3c
were excluded from the total count because of plausible threats
to validity. One image morphing study (Yamada et al., 2013)
demonstrated that the slowest identification task response times
and the most negative likability evaluations coincided with each
other; however, these results were excluded because the likability
evaluations could plausibly have been influenced by morphing
TABLE 5 | Empirical evidence for hypotheses H3 (categorization
ambiguity) and H4 (perceptual mismatch).
Author/year H3a H3b H3c H3d H3e H4a H4b
Seyama and Nagayama,
2007
+ +
MacDorman et al., 2009 + +
Looser and Wheatley, 2010 + + − −
Cheetham et al., 2011 + + −
Mitchell et al., 2011 +
Gray and Wegner, 2012 +
Yamada et al., 2013 (+) (+)
Burleigh et al., 2013 (+) −
Cheetham et al., 2013 +
Cheetham et al., 2014 + + − − −
Mäkäräinen et al., 2014 +
Total 4 3 2 3 1 4 4
+ 4 3 0 0 0 4 3
− 0 0 2 3 1 0 1
Conclusions: “+”: significant in favor of the hypothesis, and “−”: non-significant or sig-
nificant against the hypothesis. Conclusions in parentheses have been omitted from total
scores because of plausible threats to validity. Hypotheses: H3a—category identification,
H3b—perceptual discrimination, H3c—categorical identification difficulty, H3d—opposite
perceptual discrimination, H3e—perceptual discrimination difficulty, H4a—inconsistent
human-likeness, H4b—atypicality.
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artifacts (cf. Section Naïve and Morbidity Hypotheses). Consis-
tently, two participants in this study had reported spontaneously
after the experiment that “they [had] evaluated the likability of
the images based on the presence or absence of morphing noise”
(ibid., 4). A more systematic evaluation would be necessary for
deciding this issue, however. Another study (Study II in Burleigh
et al., 2013) demonstrated that intermediate CG modifications
between a goat-like and a fully humanlike face elicited the most
eerie and unpleasant evaluations. This result was, however, not
taken as evidence for the artificial–human categorization ambi-
guity (H3c) because the presence of categorization boundary was
not tested explicitly. The reported positive uncanny valley finding
is nevertheless important in the present context, because it could
be interpreted as evidence that some human-likeness manipu-
lations can lead to the uncanny valley. This finding was not
included as additional evidence for the hypothesis H1a, however,
because several other human-likenessmanipulations in this study
(Burleigh et al., 2013) did not lead to similar findings.
Perceptual Mismatch Hypotheses
As illustrated in Table 5, the results provided good support for
the perceptual mismatch hypotheses related to both inconsis-
tent realism levels (H4a; 4 out of 4 studies) and sensitivity to
atypical features (H4b; 3 out of 4 studies). Two studies (Seyama
and Nagayama, 2007; MacDorman et al., 2009) using continuous
human-likenessmanipulations demonstrated that themost nega-
tive affinity evaluations were elicited when the mismatch between
the realism of eyes and faces was the greatest (H4a) and when
artificially enlarged eyes were paired with the most realistic (fully
human) faces (H4b). Two other studies provided further support
for H4a. One study (Mitchell et al., 2011), which had used a fac-
torial design between the realism of a face (robot or human) and
voice (synthetic or human), demonstrated that mismatched face–
voice pairs elicited higher eeriness than similar matched pairs.
This result was included as support for H4a, although it should
be noticed that these results are somewhat limited because only
one pair of stimuli were used in the study. Another study (Gray
and Wegner, 2012) with conceptual stimuli demonstrated that
machines with characteristically human experiences (i.e., capabil-
ity to feel) and humans without such experiences were considered
unnerving.
Consistently with H4b, one additional study (Mäkäräinen
et al., 2014) in Table 5 demonstrated that unnaturally exagger-
ated facial expressions were rated as more strange on increasingly
humanlike faces. Contrary to H4b, one other study (Burleigh
et al., 2013) failed to demonstrate higher eeriness or unpleasant-
ness for increasingly realistic faces. Although this non-significant
finding was included in the total count, it is possible that this
result could have been specific to the atypical feature (rolled-
back eye) used in the study. Unlike enlarged eyes (e.g., Seyama
and Nagayama, 2007), for example, such features could appear
disturbing both on human and artificial faces.
Some studies that were excluded during the initial selection
because they were not fully consistent with the specific formula-
tion of the atypicality hypothesis (H4b) could nevertheless pro-
vide further evidence for it. One previous study (Green et al.,
2008) demonstrated that individuals show greater agreement
when judging the “best looking” facial proportions of human
rather than artificial faces. Similar greater agreement for more
realistic CG textures was demonstrated also in the second study
of MacDorman et al. (2009). Furthermore, the third study in the
same article showed that extreme facial proportions were con-
sidered the most eerie at close to humanlike levels. These results
strengthen the view that individuals are more sensitive and less
tolerant to deviations from typical norms when judging human
faces.
Discussion
This review considered evidence for the uncanny valley hypoth-
esis (Mori, 1970) based on a framework of specific hypotheses
motivated by previous literature. The results showed that whereas
all human-likeness manipulations do not automatically lead to
the uncanny valley, positive uncanny valley findings have been
reported in studies using perceptually mismatching stimuli. In
particular, positive uncanny valley findings have been reported
for stimuli in which the realism levels of artificial and humanlike
features are inconsistent with each other (e.g., human eyes on an
artificial face) or in which atypical features (e.g., grossly enlarged
eyes) are present on humanlike faces.
Evidence for Different Kinds of Uncanny Valleys
Given that the original uncanny valley formulation did not pro-
vide specific guidelines for operationalizing human-likeness, we
first considered the straightforward prediction that any kind of
successful human-likeness manipulation would lead to the char-
acteristic U-shaped affinity curve at almost humanlike levels. The
reviewed studies, which had used various human-likenessmanip-
ulations, provided very little support for this hypothesis. Nonlin-
ear uncanny valley effects were found only in two studies that had
studied images of hands (Poliakoff et al., 2013 and a continuous
CG modification between nonhuman and human faces (Study II
in Burleigh et al., 2013). Whether these results could be explained
by chance, some characteristics specific to these stimuli or by
the other reviewed hypotheses (e.g., categorization ambiguity or
perceptual mismatch) remains an open question. The absence of
evidence for the naïve uncanny valley hypothesis suggests that
all kinds of human-likeness manipulations do not automatically
lead to the uncanny valley. This would also suggest that individ-
ual studies using only one type of human-likeness manipulation
should not be taken as conclusive evidence for the existence or
nonexistence of the uncanny valley.
The original uncanny valley formulation also led to the sec-
ondary prediction that any kind of human-likeness manipula-
tions would elicit linear increases in experienced affinity. This
prediction was supported by the bulk of studies. This suggests
that as a general rule, increasing human-likeness is associated
with more positive experiences. Exceptions to this general rule
could be possible, however, given that different kinds of human-
likeness manipulations were not considered systematically in the
present review.
We have suggested that Mori used corpses and zombies only
as metaphorical examples when discussing threat avoidance as
a possible explanation for the uncanny valley. Because these
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examples could nevertheless be taken literally, we also consid-
ered the hypothesis that such morbid characters would elicit
negative affinity. Not surprisingly, this hypothesis received sup-
port. The inclusion of this hypothesis was successful because it
helped us avoid drawing false conclusions for the other hypothe-
ses. We conclude that empirical studies should not use purpose-
fully morbid characters to test the existence of the uncanny valley
(such stimuli could, of course, be included for other purposes).
Although another possible confound, purposeful aesthetic, could
also have originated from a literal interpretation of the original
examples, this issue did not seem to affect any of the reviewed
studies.
The original uncanny valley formulation proposed that move-
ment would amplify the characteristic uncanny curve. The
reviewed studies did not support this prediction. In contrast,
the reviewed studies again demonstrated a linear relationship
between affinity and the human-likeness of movement patterns.
Furthermore, no nonlinear uncanny valley effects were observed.
This suggests that movement information imposes similar linear
effects on affinity as any other variation in human-likeness. How-
ever, it should be noticed that refined uncanny valley hypotheses
(see below) have up to date been studied using only static stimuli,
and that movement could possibly amplify their effects.
An alternative claim to the prediction that any kind of human-
likeness manipulation leads to the uncanny valley would be
that the uncanny valley phenomenon is manifested only under
specific conditions. For evaluating this possibility, we consid-
ered empirical evidence for two refined uncanny valley propos-
als as they have been presented in existing literature. First, we
considered the claim that the uncanny valley would be caused
by an artificial–human categorization ambiguity. Although the
reviewed studies demonstrated that morphed artificial–human
face continua are perceived categorically, we were able to iden-
tify only tentative evidence for negative affinity in the vicinity
of category boundary. Taken together, these results suggest that
the uncanny valley phenomenon could not be explained solely in
terms of categorical perception. However, given the small num-
ber of reviewed studies, more conclusive results could yet be
obtained in future studies. The uncanny valley hypothesis could
also be interpreted such that it predicts greater perceptual dis-
crimination difficulty and more negative affect in the vicinity of
category boundary (cf. Cheetham et al., 2014). Neither of these
hypotheses was supported by the reviewed evidence.
Second, we considered two different perceptual mismatch
hypotheses for the uncanny valley. The first hypothesis pre-
dicted that the negative affinity associated with the uncanny val-
ley would be caused by inconsistent realism levels (e.g., artificial
eyes on a humanlike face or vice versa). The second hypothesis
predicted that such negative affinity would be elicited by height-
ened sensitivity to atypical features (e.g., grossly enlarged eyes) on
humanlike characters. Both of these hypotheses received support
from the reviewed studies. This finding is important because it
confirms the existence of the uncanny valley at least under some
specific conditions. Although previous reviews have presented
categorization difficulty and perceptual mismatch hypotheses
separately (e.g., Pollick, 2010), we are not aware that a further
distinction would have been made between different perceptual
mismatch hypotheses. Notably, the reviewed inconsistency and
atypicality hypotheses lead to slightly different symmetric and
asymmetric predictions. That is, the inconsistency hypothesis
would predict that both artificial features on humanlike char-
acters and humanlike features on artificial characters will elicit
negative affinity, whereas the atypicality hypothesis would predict
atypicality effects only for humanlike stimuli. Because both pre-
dictions received support, this suggests that inconsistent realism
levels and atypical features could represent different conditions
leading to the uncanny valley.
Open Research Questions
The present review raises several open questions for the uncanny
valley research. One of these is the relation between the percep-
tual mismatch and categorization ambiguity hypotheses, which
are not necessarily independent from each other. For example,
it is possible that realism level inconsistency and feature atyp-
icality effects could be reduced to categorical perception. This
idea could possibly be tested by varying the level of inconsistency
between features (e.g., by morphing eyes and faces separately as
in Seyama and Nagayama, 2007) or by varying the level of feature
atypicality (e.g., by varying the eye size of artificial and human
faces), and testing whether such continua would fulfill the cate-
gory identification and perceptual discrimination criteria for cat-
egorical perception (Repp, 1984; Harnad, 1987). If these criteria
were fulfilled, the results would link these effects to the broader
framework of categorical perception.
Another open question relates to whether any kind of per-
ceptual mismatch would lead to the uncanny valley or whether
this effect would apply the best or even exclusively to specific
features. For example, it might not be a coincidence that two of
the reviewed studies demonstrated a perceptual mismatch effect
for inconsistent realism levels specifically between the eyes and
faces and specifically for enlarged eyes presented on human faces
(Seyama and Nagayama, 2007; MacDorman et al., 2009). One of
the earliest reviews on the uncanny valley suggested that the eyes
would have a special role in producing the uncanny valley (Bren-
ton et al., 2005). Consistently, one image morphing study has
demonstrated that human-likeness manipulations of eyes explain
most (albeit not all) of the perceived animacy of faces (Looser and
Wheatley, 2010). Similarly, one eye tracking study has demon-
strated that eyes receive longer gaze dwell time on categorically
ambiguous than on categorically unambiguous artificial faces
(Cheetham et al., 2013). To our knowledge, the previous sugges-
tion that negative affinity would be caused by inconsistent static
and dynamic information (Brenton et al., 2005; Pollick, 2010)
also remains unexplored.
The lack of universally agreed upon operational definition for
the affinity dimension is a critical issue for uncanny valley studies.
The self-report items eeriness, likability, familiarity, and affinity
could be derived fromMori’s (1970) original formulation. Unfor-
tunately, an inspection of the reviewed articles (Table S1) reveals
that none of these single terms alone have been adopted in more
than half of the reviewed articles, even after similar terms would
be considered as their synonyms (e.g., creepy and strange for
eerie; pleasant or appealing for likable; and strange–familiar for
familiar). Furthermore, although these items are consistent with
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the original formulation, they are not necessarily theoretically
justified. One starting point for operationalizing affinity could
be the questionnaire developed by Ho and MacDorman (2010).
In the present investigation, we have defined affinity in terms
of perceptual familiarity and emotional valence. However, these
constructs are clearly separate from each other, and their relation
in the uncanny valley context would merit further investigation.
Future studies could also consider the possible influences of
image morphing artifacts on uncanny valley findings, for exam-
ple by conducting independent image quality evaluations for
morphed stimuli. Although the risk of image morphing artifacts
can be diminished considerably by following the guidelines of
Cheetham and Jäncke (2013), it is nevertheless possible that all
confounding factors would not be avoided. Specifically, some
ghosting for subtle facial features that are present in only one
of the original images and slight blurring of contours generated
by color interpolation could be unavoidable. By the nature of
image morphing procedure, middle images in the series of mor-
phed images are the most processed (in a technical sense) and
hence they differ the most from natural images that constitute the
endpoints of the series. Assuming that morphing artifacts were a
realistic concern, the level of visual distortions produced by mor-
phing would hence increase toward the middle of the generated
human-likeness continua. The effects of such visual distortions
would likely depend on the adopted research question and exper-
imental design, however. Visual distortions, which would likely
elicit negative evaluations, could lead to false negative affinity
findings at the middle of the scale. On the other hand, it seems
unlikely that visual distortions would explain the enhanced dis-
crimination of stimuli straddling the scale middle (i.e., category
boundary), as has been reported in typical categorical perception
studies. If discrimination were based on comparing visual distor-
tion levels, discrimination should on the contrary be enhanced
for adjacent images that are located on either the left or right sides
of the scale middle (i.e., for images with different distortion lev-
els) but decreased for images that straddle the scale middle (i.e.,
for images with symmetric distortion levels).
Limitations
A plausible limitation related to our conceptual analysis of the
original uncanny valley formulation (Mori, 1970) is that we have
relied on its English translation and other secondary sources
instead of the original article written in Japanese.
Given our inclusion criteria, we have only considered stud-
ies that have operationalized affinity by self-report measures. We
acknowledge that the heterogeneity of self-report items used in
the previous studies has significantly reduced the value of com-
paring their results with one another. Another consequence is
that we have omitted several relevant studies that have used phys-
iological and behavioral measures, such as gaze tracking (e.g., Shi-
mada et al., 2006) and haemodynamic response measurements
in the brain (e.g., Chaminade et al., 2007; Saygin et al., 2012).
It could also be argued that identification task response times,
which have already been utilized in some categorical studies (e.g.,
Looser andWheatley, 2010; Cheetham et al., 2011), would in fact
be good operational definitions of perceptual familiarity. A justi-
fication for the present focus on self-report measurements is that
their results are easier to interpret than those of physiological or
behavioral measures. On the other hand, it should be acknowl-
edged that physiological and behavioral measures could possibly
avoid the present ambiguities related to self-report items.
The present conclusions depend on the adopted evaluation
criteria, which are to some extent open to subjective interpre-
tations. The function of these criteria was to avoid drawing
false conclusions for our hypotheses; consequently, the criteria
focused on plausible threats to conclusions that could be drawn
from individual studies. We have attempted to facilitate the crit-
ical evaluation of this procedure by making it as transparent
as possible. Because all possible aspects of experimental validity
were not covered, the adopted criteria cannot and should not
be taken as evidence for the experimental validity of the evalu-
ated studies themselves. It should also be noticed that although
we have specified the minimal human-likeness levels required for
testing each hypothesis, this has been done solely for covering as
many studies as possible. These minimal levels should hence not
be taken as practical guidelines for empirical studies.
Although we have considered only the categorization ambigu-
ity and perceptual mismatch explanations for the uncanny val-
ley, it is worth noting that several other explanations have also
been suggested (e.g., see MacDorman and Ishiguro, 2006). For
example, it has been suggested that realistic appearance would
elicit unrealistic cognitive expectations (expectation violation);
that non-lifelike characters would trigger innate fear of death
(terror management); and that some artificial characters would
be eerie because they appear unfit, infertile, ill, or elicit other evo-
lutionarily motivated aversive responses (evolutionary aesthet-
ics). These explanations operate at different levels—the first two
refer to proximate causes (i.e., how the uncanny valley is caused),
whereas the evolutionary explanation refers to an ultimate cause
(why the uncanny valley exists; cf. Scott-Phillips et al., 2011).
Other refinements of the uncanny valley theory have suggested,
for example, that behavior that is consistent with a character’s
appearance will lead to more positive reactions (i.e., a synergy
effect; Minato et al., 2004; Ishiguro, 2006). Although these are
all empirically testable hypotheses, we have not included them in
the present review because they are either similar to the already
included hypotheses (e.g., expectation violation vs. inconsistent
realism hypotheses) or because they address higher-level topics
that seem to presuppose the existence of the uncanny valley in
one form or another.
We also acknowledge a recent refinement of the categoriza-
tion ambiguity hypothesis, which has been suggested in two other
articles of the present Frontiers Research Topic. As discussed
by Schoenherr and Burleigh (2015), the uncanny valley could
represent an overarching “inverse mere-exposure effect” (ibid.,
3), in which negative affect is caused by a lack of exposure to
specific stimuli or stimulus categories (e.g., the authors cite the
octopus as a species that is mundanely difficult to categorize).
Burleigh and Schoenherr (2015) extend this idea by demonstrat-
ing that categorization ambiguity and the frequency of exposure
to specific within-category stimuli contribute independently to
the uncanny valley. For example, novel stimuli that were extrap-
olations of their original training stimuli were categorized easily
but were nevertheless considered more eerie than stimuli within
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their training set. These recent considerations suggest that the
categorization ambiguity hypothesis alone would not necessarily
be sufficient for predicting emotional responses to the uncanny
valley.
Importance and Implications for Research and
Practice
Previous articles have already reviewed the uncanny valley phe-
nomenon (e.g., Brenton et al., 2005; Gee et al., 2005; Hanson,
2005; Ishiguro, 2007; Eberle, 2009; Pollick, 2010; Tondu and Bar-
dou, 2011; Zlotowski et al., 2013) and explicated, for example, the
categorization ambiguity (e.g., Cheetham et al., 2011) and percep-
tual mismatch (e.g., MacDorman et al., 2009) hypotheses. How-
ever, to our knowledge, this article is the first systematic review of
the empirical evidence for the uncanny valley. Conceptual anal-
ysis of the uncanny valley and consideration of plausible threats
to the conclusions drawn from previous studies to the present
hypotheses were used to improve the accuracy of our conclu-
sions. The main contribution of the present article is the conclu-
sion that all kinds of imaginable human-likeness manipulations
do not automatically lead to the uncanny valley.
The practical implications of the present findings for
computer animators and human-computer or human-robot
interaction developers hinge on whether these findings can be
generalized to realistic stimuli and contexts—that is, whether
they are externally valid (the somewhat redundant term ecolog-
ical validity could also be used; cf. Kvavilashvili and Ellis, 2004).
The present review failed to identify direct evidence for or against
the uncanny valley in realistic stimuli, with the exception of
some tentative findings (Flach et al., 2012; for other excluded
but relevant studies, see Schneider et al., 2007; Tinwell, 2009;
Tinwell et al., 2010). However, the reviewed results for artifi-
cial but well-controlled stimuli should be generalizable to com-
puter animations and other realistic stimuli as well, given that the
experimental stimuli clearly represented phenomena that would
be likely to exist also in the real world (cf. Kvavilashvili and
Ellis, 2004). For example, it is easy to imagine real computer-
animated characters, whose individual features differ from each
other with respect to their realism (i.e., perceptual mismatch due
to inconsistent realism).
The present results could be taken to encourage the develop-
ment of increasingly realistic computer animations (and other
artificial characters), given that more humanlike characters were
in general found to elicit more positive affinity. However, the
perceptual mismatch results suggest that the uncanny valley
remains a plausible threat for such characters. A generally
humanlike character with subtle flaws in some focal features (e.g.,
eyes), would be likely to elicit negative affinity. The reviewed
findings that individuals are increasingly sensitive to atypical fea-
tures on more humanlike characters would suggest that avoiding
the uncanny valley will become exponentially more difficult as
the characters’ overall appearance approaches the level of full
human-likeness. This does not mean that computer animators
or robotics researchers should shy away from the grand chal-
lenge of creating fully humanlike artificial entities. However, for
many practical applications, there may be certain wisdom in the
Mori’s (1970) original advice of escaping the uncanny valley by
attempting to design only moderately humanlike entities.
Conclusion
Taken together, the present review suggested that although not
any kind of human-likeness manipulation leads to the uncanny
valley, the uncanny valley could be caused by more specific per-
ceptual mismatch conditions. Such conditions could originate, at
least, from inconsistent realism levels between individual features
(e.g., artificial eyes on a humanlike face) or from the presence
of atypical features (e.g., atypically large eyes) on an otherwise
humanlike character. Categorical perception of human-likeness
continua ranging from artificial to human was supported; how-
ever, the present findings failed to support the suggestion that
categorization ambiguity would be associated with experienced
negative affinity. The results also highlight the need for develop-
ing a unified metric for evaluating the subjective, perceptual, and
emotional experiences associated with the uncanny valley.
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